Classical results on secure multi-party computation (MPC) imply that fully secure computation, including fairness (either all parties get output or none) and robustness (output delivery is guaranteed), is impossible unless a majority of the parties is honest. Recently, cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin where utilized to leverage the fairness loss in MPC against a dishonest majority. The idea is that when the protocol aborts in an unfair manner (i.e., after the adversary receives output) then honest parties get compensated by the adversarially controlled parties.
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) enables a set of parties to evaluate the output of a known function f (·) on inputs they privately contribute to the protocol execution. The design of secure MPC protocols, initiated with the seminal works of Yao [Yao82] and Goldreich et al. [GMW87] has evolved to a major effort in computer security engineering. Beyond privacy, a secure MPC protocol is highly desirable to be fair (either all parties learn the output or none) and robust (the delivery of the output is guaranteed and the adversary cannot mount a "denial of service" against the protocol). Achieving fairness and robustness in a setting where there is an arbitrary number of corruptions, as desirable as it may appear, is prohibited by strong impossibility results stemming from the work of Cleve [Cle86] who showed that coin-flipping is infeasible in any setting where there is no honest majority among parties that execute the protocol. These impossibility results, combined with the importance of the properties that they prevent, strongly motivate the exploration of alternate -yet still realistic -models that would enable fair and robust MPC protocols.
With the advent of Bitcoin [Nak08] and other decentralized cryptocurrencies, the works of [ADMM14a, ADMM14b, BK14, KB14] showed a new direction for circumvention of the impossibility results regarding the fairness property: enforcing fairness could be achieved through imposing monetary penalties. In this setting a breach of fairness by the adversary is still possible but it results in the honest parties collecting a compensation in a way that is determined by the protocol execution. At the same time, in case fairness is not breached, it is guaranteed that no party loses any money (despite the fact that currency transfers may have taken place between the parties). The rationale here is that a suitable monetary penalty suffices in most practical scenarios to force the adversary to operate in the protocol fairly.
While the main idea of fairness with penalties sounds simple enough, its implementation proves to be quite challenging. The main reason is that the way a crypto-currency operates does not readily provide a trusted party that will collect money from all participants and then either return it or redistribute it according to the pre-agreed penalty structure. This is because cryptocurrencies are decentralized and hence no single party is ever in control of a money transfer beyond the owner of a set of coins. The mechanism used in [ADMM14a,ADMM14b,BK14,KB14] to circumvent the above problem is the capability 1 of the Bitcoin network to issue transactions that are "time-locked", i.e., become valid only after a specific time and prior to that time may be superseded by other transactions that are posted in the public ledger. Superseded time-locked transactions become invalid and remain in the ledger without ever being redeemed.
While the above works are an important step for the design of MPC protocols with properties that circumvent the classical impossibility results, several critical open questions remain to be tackled; those we address herein are as follows.
Our Results.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we put forth a new formal model of secure MPC with compensation and we show how the introduction of suitable ledger and synchronization functionalities makes it possible to express completely such protocols using standard interactive Turing machines (ITM) circumventing the need for the use of extra features that are outside the standard model (in comparison, the only previous model [BK14] resorted to specialized ITM's that utilize resources outside the computational model 2 ). Second, our model is equipped with a composition theorem that enables the design of protocols that compose safely with each other and within larger environments where other protocols with compensation take place; a composition theorem for this class of protocols was not known before. Third, we introduce the first robust MPC protocol with compensation, i.e., an MPC protocol where not only fairness is guaranteed (via compensation) but additionally the protocol is guaranteed to deliver output to the parties that get engaged and therefore the adversary is not even able to mount a denial of service attack without having to suffer a monetary penalty. In more details we have the following.
• We put forth a new model that utilizes two ideal functionalities and express the ledger of transactions and a clock in the sense of [KMTZ13] that is connected to the ledger and enables parties to synchronize their protocol interactions. Our ledger functionality enable us to abstract all the necessary features of the underlying cryptocurrency. Contrary to the only previous formalization approach [ BK14, KB14] , our modeling allows the entities that participate in an MPC execution to be regular interactive Turing machines (ITM) and there is no need to equip them with additional physical features such as "safes" and "locks." Furthermore the explicit inclusion of the clock functionality (which is only alluded to in [BK14, KB14] ) reveal the exact dependencies between the ledger and the clock functionality that are necessary in order for MPC with compensation protocols to be properly described. We express our model within a general framework that we call Q-fairness and may be of independent interest as it can express meaningful relaxations of fairness in the presence of a global ideal functionality.
• We prove a composition theorem that establishes that protocols in our framework are secure in a universally composable fashion. Our composition proof treats the clock and ledger functionalities as global setups in the sense of [CDPW07, CJS14] . We emphasize that this is a critical design choice: the fact that the ledger is a global functionality ensures that any penalties that are incurred to the adversary that result to credits towards the honest parties will be globally recognized. This should be contrasted to an approach that utilizes regular ideal functionalities which may be only accessible within the scope of a single protocol instance and hence any penalty bookkeeping they account may vanish with the completion of the protocol. Providing a composition theorem for MPC protocols with compensation was left as an open question in [BK14] .
• We finally present a new protocol for fair and robust secure MPC with compensation. The robustness property we prove guarantees that once the protocol passes an initial round of deposits, parties are guaranteed to obtain output or be compensated. This is in contrast to fair MPC with compensation [ADMM14a, ADMM14b, BK14, KB14] where the guarantee is that compensation takes place only in case the adversary obtains output while an honest party does not. To put it differently, it is feasible for the adversary to lead the protocol to a deadlock where no party receives output however the honest parties have wasted resources by introducing transactions in the ledger. We remark that it is in principle possible to upgrade the protocols of [ADMM14a,ADMM14b,BK14,KB14] to the robust MPC setting by having them perform an MPC with identifiable abort, cf. [GMW87, IOZ14] , (in such protocol the party that causes the abort can be identified and excluded from future executions). However even using such protocol the resulting robust MPC with compensation will need in the worst case a linear number of deposit/communication rounds in the number of malicious parties. Contrary to that, our robust protocol can be instantiated so that it requires a constant number of deposit/communication rounds independently of the number of parties that are running the protocol. Our construction uses time-locked transactions in a novel way to ensure that parties do progress in the MPC protocol or otherwise transactions are suitably revertible to a compensation for the remaining parties. The structure of our transactions is quite more complex than what can be presently supported by bitcoin; we provide a high level overview of how our protocol can be implemented via Ethereum 3 contracts.
Related work. Beyond the previous works [ADMM14a, ADMM14b, BK14, KB14] in fair MPC with compensation there is a number of other works that attempted to circumvent the impossibility results for fairness in the setting of dishonest majority by considering alternate models. Contrary to the approach based on cryptocurrencies these works give an advantage to the protocol designer with respect to the adversarial strategy for corruption. For instance, in [GKM + 13] a rational adversary is proposed and the protocol designer is privy to the utility function of the adversary. In [ALZ13] a reputation system is used and the protocol designer has the availability of the reputation information of the parties that will be engaged in the protocol. Finally in [GGJ + 15] a two tiered model is proposed where the protocol designer is capable of distinguishing two distinct sets of servers at the onset of the computation that differ in terms of their corruptibility. Global setups were first put forth in [CDPW07] motivated by notion of deniability in cryptographic protocols. In our work we utilize global functionalities for universal composition (without the deniability aspect) as in [CJS14] where a similar approach was taken for the case of the use of the random oracle as a global setup functionality for MPC.
Fairness can also be considered from the resource perspective, cf. [BN00, Pin03, GMPY06], where it is guaranteed due to the investment of proportional resources between the parties running the protocol, and the optimistic perspective, cf. [ASW97,ASW98,CC00], where a trusted mediator can be invoked in the case of an abort. We finally note that without any additional assumptions, due to the impossibility results mentioned above, one can provide fairness only with certain high probability that will be affecting the complexity of the resulting protocol, see, e.g., [GK09] and references therein.
Model
In this section, we lay down a formal framework for designing composable fair protocols in the presence of globally available trusted resources. In the first two subsections, we introduce shared (in the sense of the GUC model [CDPW07] ) functionalitiesḠ clock andḠ ledger respectively to formulate the trust resources that provided by Bitcoin-like systems. Then in subsection 2.3, we put forth a new formal model of secure MPC with compensation: we introduce the notion of Q-fairness, and formulate it via a wrapper functionality; we then consider the realization of such wrapper functionality, and further provide a composition theorem. In the end of this section, a sampling functionality for producing correlated randomness is also described. This will be used as setup in our protocol design.
Global Clock Functionality and Synchronous Protocol Executions
We here first define a shared clock functionalityḠ clock . This functionality can be viewed as an extension of the clock functionality that was defined by Katz et al. [KMTZ13] . The main intuition behind the clock functionality is that when all honest parties agree to move to the next "clock tick", then the clock functionality will increase its state, τ , by 1. We remark that there are differences between our formulation and that by Katz et al. [KMTZ13] : there, the clock is for a single protocol; however, here we intend to have the clock to be accessed globally. In addition, in [KMTZ13] , the functionality state is binary while here, in our formulation, the state τ is a positive integer. The detailed description of the clock functionality can be found in Figure 1 .
FunctionalityḠ clock
Shared functionalityḠ clock is globally available to all participants. The shared functionality is parameterized with variables τ and P.
Initially, τ := 0 and P := ∅.
• Upon receiving (register, sid) from some party P , then set P := P ∪ {P } and initialize d P := 0.
• Upon receiving (clock-update, sid) from some party P ∈ P, then set d P := 1.
At any moment, if d P = 1 for all P ∈ H, where H denotes the set of honest parties, then set τ := τ + 1, and reset d P := 0 for all P ∈ P.
• Upon receiving (clock-read, sid) from some participant, return (clock-read, sid, τ ) to the requestor. Next, we elaborate and explain how to use the global clock to design synchronous protocols. To capture synchronous protocol execution in the globalḠ clock model we use the compiler idea from [KMTZ13] . First, as is the case in real-life synchronous protocols we assume that the protocol participants have agreed on the starting time τ 0 of their protocol and also on the duration of each round. We abstract this knowledge by assuming the parties know a function Round2Time : Z → Z which maps protocol rounds to time (according to the global clock). In particular, Round2Time(0) is the time τ 0 in which a common reference string may be included in the ledger. For ρ ∈ Z + , Round2Time(ρ) is the time in which the ρth round of the protocol should be completed. That is, if at time Round2Time(ρ) + 1 a party P i has not received P j 's ρ-round message, then it takes this message to be a default message ⊥. To make sure that no party proceeds to round ρ + 1 of the protocol before all honest parties have completed round ρ, we require that any two protocol rounds are at least two clock-ticks apart (see [KMTZ13] for a discussion); formally, for all ρ ≥ 0, it holds that Round2Time(ρ + 1) ≥ Round2Time(ρ) + 2.
A synchronous protocol in the above setting proceeds as follows: Upon receiving any activation , party P i first queries the clock (i.e., sendḠ clock the message (read, sid)) to find out the current time. Denote by τ the time reported byḠ clock . P i checks that τ ≥ Round2Time(0), and halts if this is not the case. Otherwise, P i checks whether it has completed its protocol instructions for rounds 0, . . . , ρ c , where
If this is not the case, P i executes its next pending instruction (for round ρ c ); 4 otherwise, P i sends (clock-update, sid) to the clock. 5
Global Ledger Functionality
FunctionalityḠ ledger provides the abstraction of a public ledger in Bitcoin-like systems (e.g., Bitcoin, Litecoin, Namecoin, Ethereum, etc). Intuitively, the public ledger could be accessed globally by protocol parties or other entities including the environment Z. Protocol parties or the environment can generate transactions; and these valid transactions will be gathered by a set of ledger maintainers (e.g., miners in Bitcoin-like systems) in certain order as the state of the ledger. More concretely, whenever the ledger maintainers receive a vector of transactions tx, they first add the transactions in a buffer, assuming they are valid with respect to the existing transactions and the state of the ledger; thus, in this way a vector of transactions is formed in the buffer. After certain amount of time, denoted by T, all transactions in the buffer will be "glued" into the ledger state in the form of a block. In Bitcoin, T is 10 minutes (approximately); thus in about every 10 minutes, a new block of transactions will be included into the ledger, and the ledger state will be updated correspondingly.
FunctionalityḠ ledger
Shared functionalityḠ ledger is globally available to all participants. The shared functionality is parameterized with a predicate Validate, a constant T, and variables state, buffer and counter.
Initially, state := ∅, buffer := ∅, and counter := 0.
• Upon receiving (submit, sid, tx) from some participant, send (clock-read, sid) tō G clock and receive (clock-read, sid, τ ) fromḠ clock . If Validate(state, (buffer, tx)) = 1, then set buffer := buffer|| tx. If |τ − T · counter| > T, then set state := state||Blockify(τ, buffer) and buffer := ∅ and counter := counter + 1.
• Upon receiving (read, sid) from some participant, return (read, sid, state) to the requestor.
Figure 2: The public ledger functionality.
To enable the ledger to be aware of time, the ledger maintainers are allowed to "read" the state of another publicly available functionalityḠ clock defined above.
We remark that all gathered transactions should be "valid" which is defined by a predicate Validate. In different systems, predicate Validate will take different forms. For example, in the Bitcoin system, the predicate Validate should make sure that for each newly received transaction that transfers v coins from the original wallet address address o to the destination wallet address address d , the original wallet address address o should have v or more than v coins, and the transaction should be generated by the original wallet holder (as shown by the issuance of a digital signature). Furthermore, prior to each vector of transactions becoming block, the vector is passed through a function Blockify(·) that homogenizes the sequence of transactions in the form of a block. Moreover, in some systems like Bitcoin, it may add a special transaction called a "coinbase" transaction that implements a reward mechanism for the ledger maintainers.
In Figure 2 we provide the details of the ledger functionality.
Q-fairness and Secure Computation with Fair Compensation
In this subsection, we provide a formal framework for secure computation with fair compensation. In the spirit of [GMPY06] , our main tool is a wrapper functionality. Our wrapper functionality is equipped with a predicate 6 QḠ which can be used to "monitor" the state of the global setupḠ. If certain "bad" event occurs (such as an abort), then the predicate QḠ will be triggered, and the functionality will halt. With foresight Q will ensure that parties that abort are compensated. Any implementation of the wrapped functionality should ensure that such a halt event is not triggered with non-negligible probability. We will call such an implementation a Q-fair implementation. Our framework can be defined with respect to any global setup that upon receiving a read symbol it returns its public state trans. LetḠ be such a global ideal functionality and let QḠ a predicate with respect to suchḠ. Let F be a secure function evaluation (SFE) functionality which is fair in the sense of [GMPY06] : it returns output in two different ways: (i) delayed delivery: (deliver, sid, m, P ) signifying delayed output delivery 7 of m to party P , (ii) fair delivery: (fair-deliver, sid, (m, P i 1 ), . . . , (m, P i k ), (m S , S)) that results in simultaneous 8 delivery of outputs m i 1 , . . . m i k to parties P i 1 , . . . , P i k and output m S to S.
The wrapper functionality W that will be used in the definition of Q-fair secure computation is given in Figure 3 . The intuition is that the Q predicate will be applied on the public state ofḠ whenever the wrapper "breaks" the fair delivery of the inner functionality F. We are now ready to define Q-fairness with respect to a global functionality.
Definition 2.1. We say protocol π realizes functionality F with QḠ-fairness with respect to global functionalityḠ, provided the following statement is true. For all adversaries A, there is a simulator S so that for all environments Z it holds:
The following lemma captures the intuition that computing the inner functionality is at least as strong as computing it with Q-fairness.
Lemma 2.2. LetḠ be a global ideal functionality. Let QḠ be any predicate with respect toḠ. Then for all adversaries A, there is a simulator S so that for all environments Z, it holds:
The above lemma can be easily proved, because the simulator S by returning (fair-deliver, sid, mid) to the wrapper functionality, can avoid the predicate QḠ be triggered.
More generally, the protocol σ realizes H with Q Ḡ fairness using a functionality F with fairness QḠ provided that for all adversaries A, there is a simulator S so that for all environments Z, it holds:
We note that, both protocol π and the functionality (W(F, QḠ),Ḡ) are with respect to the global functionalityḠ 9 . By following the very similar proof idea of proving UC/GUC composition [Can01, CDPW07] , we can prove the following:
Functionality W(F, QḠ) interacts with a set of parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, the adversary S and the environment Z, as well as shared functionalityḠ. The functionality is parameterized with an n-party functionality F and a predicate QḠ.
• Submitting an input. Upon receiving (label, sid, x) from a party P , it forwards (label, sid, x) to F. In case F produces a message µ for S it forwards ((label, sid, P ), µ) to S.
• Associating a label to a party. On input (label, sid, P, L) from S it records L sid,P = L and returns (label, sid, P, L) to P .
• Generating delayed output. On input a message from F marked (deliver, sid, m, P ) it forwards m to party P via delayed output.
• Registering fair output.
On input a message from F that is marked for fair delivery (fair-deliver, sid, mid,
• Delayed fair output delivery. Upon receiving (fair-deliver, sid, mid) from S then provided that a message (mid, . . .) has been delivered to the adversary, all pairs (m j , P j )'s associated with mid are sent to P j 's simultaneously.
• QḠ-fair delivery.
Upon receiving (Q-deliver, sid, mid) from S then provided that a message (mid, . . .) has been delivered to the adversary operate as follows. For each pair of the form (m, P ) associated with mid where P is corrupted, the adversary S receives (m, P ). For each party P that is corrupted the pair (m, P ) in mid is marked as delivered. Every other pair in mid is marked undelivered. Subsequently perform the following.
-On input a message (deliver, sid, mid, P ) from S, provided that the record mid contains the pair (m, P ) that is undelivered then send read toḠ, denote the responce by trans and if ¬QḠ(sid, L sid,P , 1, trans) then halt. Else, the party P will receive m and the pair (m, P ) in mid is marked delivered.
-On input a message (abort, sid, mid, P ) from S, provided that the record mid contains the pair (m, P ) that is undelivered then send read toḠ, denote the responce by trans and if ¬QḠ(sid, L sid,P , 0, trans) then halt. Else, the party P will receive ⊥ and the pair (m, P ) in mid is marked aborted. Lemma 2.3. Let QḠ be a predicate with respect to global functionalityḠ. Let π be a protocol that realizes the functionality F with QḠ-fairness. Let σ be a protocol in (W(F, QḠ),Ḡ)-hybrid world. Then for all adversaries A, there is a simulator S so that for all environments Z, it holds
Theorem 2.4. Let QḠ and Q Ḡ be predicates with respect to global functionalityḠ. Let π be a protocol that realizes the functionality F with QḠ-fairness. Let σ be a protocol in (W(F, QḠ),Ḡ)-hybrid world that realizes the functionality H with Q Ḡ -fairness. Then for all adversaries A, there is a simulator S so that for all environments Z it holds:
Please see appendix for the proof. We are now ready to instantiate the notion of Q-fairness with a compensation mechanism.
Computation with Fair Compensation. For the case whenḠ implements the Bitcoin-like ledger and QḠ provides compensation of c bitcoin, where c > 0, in the case of an abort the predicate QḠ(sid, L, bit, trans) operates as follows: it parses L as a pair of (address, sk) where address is a bitcoin address and sk is the corresponding secret-key. Then it parses trans as a bitcoin ledger that contains transactions. Transactions in trans can also be marked with metadata. The following hold :
• If bit = 1, then QḠ outputs true if and only if the balance of all transactions (both incoming and outgoing) that concern address in trans and carry the meta-data sid is greater equal to 0.
• If bit = 0, then QḠ outputs true if and only if the balance of all transactions (both incoming and outgoing) that concern address in trans and carry the meta-data sid is greater equal to c.
Correlated Randomness as a Sampling Functionality
Our protocols are in the correlated randomness model, i.e., they assume that the parties initially, before receiving their inputs, receive appropriately correlated random strings. In particular, the parties jointly hold a vector R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n , where P i holds R i , drawn from a given efficiently samplable distribution D. This is, as usual, captured by giving the parties initial access to an ideal functionality F D corr , known as a sampling functionality, which, upon receiving a default input from any party, samples R from D and distributes it to the parties. Hence, a protocol in the correlated randomness model is formally an F D corr -hybrid protocol. Formally, a sampling functionality F D corr is parameterized by an efficiently computable sampling distribution D and the (ID's of the parties in) the player set P.
Functionality F D corr interacts with a set of parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, the adversary S and the environment Z. The functionality is parameterized with a distribution sampler D.
• Upon receiving (request, sid) from any party or the adversary, set R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) ← D and for each P i ∈ P send (request, sid, R i ) to P i (or to the adversary if P i is corrupted).
Figure 4: The correlated randomness functionality.
Our fair protocol compiler
In this section we present our fair protocol compiler. Our compiler compiles a synchronous protocol π sh which is secure (i.e., private) against a corrupted majority in the semi-honest correlated randomness model (e.g, an OT-hybrid protocol where the OT's have been pre-computed) into a protocol π which is secure with fair-compensation in the malicious correlated randomness model. The high-level idea is the following: We first compile π sh into a protocol in the malicious correlated randomness model, which is executed over a broadcast channel and is secure with publicly identifiable abort. (Roughly, this means that someone observing the protocol execution can decide, upon abort, which party is not executing its code.) This protocol is then transformed into a protocol with fair compensation as follows: Every party (after receiving his correlated randomness setup) posts to the ledger transactions that the other parties can claim only if they, later, post transactions that prove that they follow their protocol. Transactions that are not claimed this way are returned to the source address; thus, if some party does not post such a proof it will not be able to claim the corresponding transaction, and will therefore leave the honest parties with a positive balance as their transactions will be refunded. Observe that these are not standard Bitcoin transactions, but they have a special format which is described in the following. Importantly, the protocol we describe is guaranteed to either produce output in as many (Bitcoin) rounds are the rounds of the original malicious protocol, or to compensate all honest parties. This robustness property is achieved by a novel technique which ensures that as soon as the honest parties make their initial transaction, the adversary has no way of preventing them from either computing their output or being compensated. Informally, our technique consists of splitting the parties into "islands" depending on the transactions they post (so that all honest parties are on the same island) and then allowing them either compute the function within their island, or if they abort to get compensated. (The adversary has the option of being included or not in the honest parties' island.)
MPC with Publicly Identifiable Abort
As a first step in our compiler we invoke the semi-honest to malicious with identifiable abort compiler of Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Zikas [IOZ14] (hereafter referred to as the IOZ compiler). This compiler takes a semi-honest protocol π sh in the correlated randomness model and transforms it to a protocol in the malicious correlated randomness model (for an appropriate setup) which is secure with identifiable abort, i.e., when it aborts, every party learns the identity of a corrupted party. The compiler in [IOZ14] follows the so called GMW paradigm [GMW87] , which in a nutshell has every party commit to its input and randomness for executing the semi-honest protocol π sh and then has every party run π sh over a broadcast channel, where in each round ρ every party broadcast his round ρ messages and proves in zero-knowledge that the broadcasted message is correct, i.e., that he knows input and randomness that are consistent with the initial commitments and the (public) view of the protocol so far. The main difference of the IOZ compiler and the GMW compiler is that the parties are not only committed to their randomness, but they are also committed to their entire setup string, i.e., their private component of the correlated randomness. More concretely, the resulting malicious protocol π m (which is based on the compiler in [IOZ14] ) has the following properties:
Every party is committed to his setup, i.e., the part of the correlated randomness it holds. That is, every party P i receives from the setup his randomness (which we refer to as P i 's private component of the setup) along with one-to-many commitments 10 on the private components of all parties. Wlog, we also assume that a common-reference string (CRS) and a public-key infrastructure (PKI) are included in every party's local randomess. The malicious protocol uses only the broadcast channel for communication.
Given the correlated randomness setup, the malicious protocol is completely deterministic. This is achieved in [IOZ14] by ensuring that all the randomness used in the protocol, even the one needed for the zero-knowledge proofs, is part of the correlated randomness distributed by the sampling functionality. 11 π m starts off by having every party broadcast a one-time pad encryption of its input with its (committed) randomness and a NIZK that it knows the input and randomness corresponding to the broadcasted message. By convention, the next-message function of the malicious protocol is such that if in any round the transcript seen by a party is an aborting transcript, i.e., is not consistent with an accepting run of the semi-honest protocol, then the party outputs ⊥ (see below for a detailed formulation).
There is a (known) upper bound on the number ρ m of rounds of π m . We also stress that, given appropriate setup, the IOZ-compiler achieve information-theoretic security, and needs therefore to build information-theoretic commitments and zero-knowledge proofs. As in this work we are only after computational security, we modify the IOZ compiler so that we use (computationally) UC secure one-to-many commitments [CLOS02] and computationally UC secure non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) instead if their i.t. instantiation suggested in [IOZ14] . Both the UC commitment and the NIZKs can be built in the CRS model. Moreover, the use of UC secure instantiations of zero-knowledge and commitments ensures that the resulting protocol will be (computationally) secure.
Using the setup within a subset of parties. A standard property of many protocols in the correlated-randomness model is that once the parties in P have received the setup, any subset P ⊂ P is able to use it to perform a computation of a |P |-party function amongst them while ignoring parties in P \ P . More concretely, assume the parties in P have been handed a setup distributed allowing them to execute some protocol π for computing any |P|-party function f ; then for any P ⊆ P, the parties in P can use their setup within a protocol π| P to compute any |P |-party function f | |P | . This property which will prove very useful for obtaining computation with robustness or compensation, is also satisfied by the IOZ protocol, as the parties in P can simply ignore the commitments (public setup component) corresponding to parties in P \ P .
Making Identifiability Public. The general idea of our protocol is to have every party issue transactions by which he commits to transferring a certain amount of bitcoin per party for each protocol round. All these transactions are issued at the beginning of the protocol execution, but every party can claim the "committed" coins transferred to him associated to some protocol round ρ only under the following conditions: (1) the claim is posted in the time-interval corresponding to round ρ; (2) the party has claimed all his transferred bitcoins associated to the previous rounds; and (3) the party has posted a transaction which includes his valid message for round ρ.
In order to ensure that a party cannot claim his bitcoins unless he follows the protocol, the ledger (more concretely the validation predicate) should be able to check that the party is indeed posting a message corresponding to its next protocol message. In other words, in each round ρ, P i 's round-ρ message acts a witness for P i claiming all the bitcoins transferred to him associated with this round ρ. To this direction we make the following modification to the protocol: Let f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) denote the n-party function we wish to compute, and let F +1 be the (n + 1)-party function which takes input x i from each P i , i ∈ [n], and no input from P n+1 and outputs y i to each P i and a special symbol (e.g., 0) to P n+1 . Clearly, if π sh is a semi-honest n-party protocol for computing f over broadcast, then the n + 1 protocol π sh in which every P i with i ∈ [n] executes π sh and P n+1 simply listens to the broadcast channel is a secure protocol for F +1 . Now if π m denotes the (n + 1)-party malicious protocol which results by applying the above modified IOZ compiler on the (n + 1)-party semi-honest protocol for computing the function F +1 , then, by construction this protocol computes function F +1 with identifiable abort and has the following properties:
Party P n+1 does not make any use of his private randomness whatsoever; this is true because he broadcasts no messages and simply verifies the broadcasted NIZKs. If some party P i , i ∈ [n] deviates from running π sh with the correlated (committed) randomness as distributed from the sampling functionality, then this is detected by all parties, including P n+1 (and protocol π m aborts with this party). This follows by the soundness of the NIZK which P i needs to provide proving that he is executing π sh in every round. Due to P n+1 's role as an observer who gets to decide if the protocol is successful (P n+1 outputs 0) or some party deviated (P n+1 observes that the corresponding NIZK verification failed) in the following we will refer to P n+1 in the above protocol as the judge. The code of the judge can be used by anyone who has the public setup and wants to follow the protocol execution and decide whether it should abort or not given the parties' messages. Looking ahead, the judge's code in the protocol will be used by the ledger to decide wether or not a transaction that claims some committed coins is valid.
Special Transactions supported by our Ledger
In this section we specify the Validate and the Blockify predicates that are used for achieving our protocol's properties. More specifically, our protocol uses the following type of transactions which transfer v coins from wallet address i to wallet address j conditioned on a statement Σ:
where σ i is a signature of the transaction, which can be verified under wallet address i ; τ is the time-stamp, i.e., the current value of the clock when this transaction is posted by the ledgernote that this timestamp is added by the ledger and not by the users,-aux ∈ {0, 1} * is an arbitrary string 12 ; and the statement Σ consists of three arguments, i.e., Σ = (arg 1 , arg 2 , arg 3 ), which are processed by the validate predicate in order to decide if the transaction is valid (i.e., if it will be included in the ledger's next block). The validation happens by processing the arguments of Σ in a sequential order, where if while processing of some argument the validation rejects, algorithm Validate stops processing at that point and this transaction is dropped. The arguments are defined/processed as follows:
The first argument is a pair arg 1 = (τ − , τ + ) ∈ Z × (Z + ∪ {∞}) of points in time. If τ − > τ + then the transaction is invalid (i.e., it will be dropped by the ledger). Otherwise, before time τ − the coins in the transaction "remain" blocked, i.e., no party can spend them; from time τ − until time τ + , the money can be spent by the owner of wallet address j provided that the spending statement satisfies also the rest of the requirements/arguments in statement Σ (listed below). After time τ + the money can be spent by the owner of wallet address i without any additional restrictions (i.e., the rest of the arguments in Σ are not parsed and the transaction is dealt with as a standard Bitcoin transaction with receiver address i ). As a special case, if τ + = ∞ then the transferred coins can be spent from address j at any point (provided the spending statement is satisfied); we say then that the transaction is time-unrestricted, 13 otherwise we say that the transaction is time restricted.
Spending Link: Provided that the processing of the first argument, as above, was not rejecting, the validate predicate proceeds to the second argument, which is a unique anchor, arg 2 = α ∈ {0, 1} * . Informally, this serves as a unique identifier for linked transactions; that is, when α =⊥, then the Validate algorithm of the ledger looks in the ledger's state and buffer to confirm that the balance of transactions to/from the wallet address address i with this anchor arg 2 is at least v > v coins. That is, the sum of bitcoins in existing valid transaction (in the state of in the buffer) with receiver address address i and anchor arg 2 minus the sum of bitcoins in existing valid transaction (in the state or in the buffer) with sender address address i and anchor arg 2 is greater than v. If this is not the case then the transaction is rendered invalid; otherwise the validation of this argument succeeds and the algorithm proceeds to the next argument. To spice up the terminology, we call a transaction which has a non-⊥ anchor argument a linked transaction.
State-Dependent Condition:
The last argument to be validated is arg 3 , which is a relation R : S × B × T → {0, 1}, where S, B, and T are the domains of possible ledger-states, ledgerbuffers, and transactions, respectively (in a given encoding). This argument defines which type of transactions can spend the coins transferred in the current transaction. That is, in order to spend the coins, the receiver needs to submit a transaction tx ∈ T such that R(state, buffer, tx) = 1. We point out that as with standard Bitcoin transactions, the validation predicate will always also check validity of the signature σ i with respect to the wallet address i . Moreover, the standard Bitcoin transactions can trivially be casted as transactions of the above type by setting α =⊥ and Σ = ((0, ∞), ⊥, R ∅ ), where R ∅ denotes the relation which is always true.
The Blockify algorithm groups transactions in the current buffer and adds a timestamp. 14
The protocol
Let π m denote the above described malicious protocol. Consistently to our terminology, let Round2Time(1) denote the time in which the parties have agreed to start the protocol execution. Wlog, assume that Round2Time(1) > 2T+2. 15 Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that each party P i receives its input x i with its first activation from the environment at time Round2Time(1) (if some honest party does not have an input by that time it will execute the protocol with a default input, e.g., 0). Informally, the protocol proceeds as follows: In a pre-processing step, before the parties receive input, the parties invoke the sampling functionality for π m to receive their correlated randomness. 16 The public component of this randomness includes their protocol-associated wallet address i which they output (to the environment). The environment is then expected to submit ρ m special (as above) coin-transfers for each pair of parties P i ∈ P and p j ∈ P; the source wallet-address for each such transaction is P i 's, i.e., address i and the target wallet-address for is P j 's, i.e., address j , and the corresponding anchors are as follows:
, where 17 pid is the GUC protocol ID for π m . Since by assumption, Round2Time(1) > 2T + 2, the environment has sufficient time to submit these transaction so that by the time the protocol strarts they have been posted on the ledger.
At time Round2Time(1) − T the parties receive their inputs and initiate the protocol execution by first checking that sufficient funds are allocated to their wallets linked to the protocol executions by appropriate anchors, as above. If some party does not have sufficient funds then it broadcast an aborting message and all parties abort. (Note that this is a fair abort and no party has spent any time into making transactions.) Otherwise, parties make the special transactions that commit them (see below) into executing the protocol, and then proceed into claiming them one-by-one by executing their protocol in a round-by-round fashion.
Note that the protocol is executed in Bitcoin rounds so that the parties have enough time to claim their transaction. In fact, every protocol round is stretched to a Bitcoin rounds, i.e., Round2Time(i + 1) − Round2Time(i) ≥ T, which will guarantee that any transaction submitted for round ρ, ρ = 1, . . . , ρ m − 1, of the protocol, has been posted on the ledger by the beginning of round ρ + 1. By using a constant round malicious protocol π m (e.g., the modified compiled protocol from [IOZ14] instantiated with a constant round semi-honest protocol) we can ensure that our protocol will terminate in a constant number of Bitcoin rounds and every honest party will either receive its input, or will have a positive balance in its wallet. As already mentioned, achieving such a robustness property with known protocols would require a linear (in the number of corrupted parties) number of rounds which for large player sets is unrealistic.
Remark 3.1 (On availability of funds). Unlike existing works, we choose to explicitly treat the issue of how funds become available to the protocol by making the off-line transfers external to the protocol itself (i.e., the environment takes care of them). However, the fact that the environment is in charge of "pouring" money into the wallets that are used for the protocol does not exclude that the parties might be actually the ones having done so. Indeed, the environment's goal is to capture everything that is done on the side of, before, or after the protocol, including other protocols that the parties might have participated in. By giving the environment enough time to ensure these transactions are posted we ensure that some honest party not having enough funds corresponds to an environment that makes the computation abort (in a fair way and only in the pre-processing phase, before the parties have invested time into posting protocol transactions).
Another issue to be discussed, is how we arrange that the balance of honest parties is positive in case of an abort. This is achieved as follows by exploiting the power of our special transactions: we require that the auxiliary string of a transaction of a party P j which claims a committed transaction for some round ρ includes his ρ-round protocol message. We then have the relation of this transaction be such that it evaluates to 1 if only if this is indeed P j 's next message. Thus, effectively the validate predicate implements the judge and can, therefore, decide if some party aborted: if some party broadcasts a message that would make the judge abort, then the validate predicate drops the corresponding transaction and all claims for committed transactions corresponding to future rounds, thus, all other parties are allowed to reclaim their committed bitcoins starting from the next round.
The last question is: how is the ledger able to know which parties should participate in the protocol? Here is the problem: The adversary might post in the first round (as part of the committing transaction for the first round) a fake, maliciously generated setup. Since the ledger is not part of the correlated randomness sampling, it would be impossible to decide which is 17 Recall that we assume |P| = n. the good setup. We solve this issue by a the following technique that is inspired by [BCL + 05]: The ledger 18 groups together parties that post the same setup; these parties form "islands", i.e, subsets of P. For each such subset P ⊆ P ∪ {P n+1 } which includes the judge P n+1 , the ledger acts as if the parties in P are executing the protocol π m | P (which, recall, is the restriction of π m to the parties in P ) for computing the |P |-party function F +1 | P ( x) defined as follows: let the function to be computed be f ( x), where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and F +1 be as above, then F +1 | P ( x) = F +1 ( x P ) where x P = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with x i = x i for P i ∈ P and x i being a default value for every P i ∈ P . This solves the problem as all honest parties will be in the same island P ⊂ P (as they will all post the same value for public randomness); thus if the adversary chooses not to post this value on behalf of some corrupted party, he is effectively setting this party's input to a default value, a strategy which is easily simulatable. (Of course, the above solution will allow the adversary to also have "islands" of only corrupted parties that might execute the protocol, but this is also a fully simulatable strategy and has not effect on fair-compensation whatsoever-corrupted parties are not required to have a positive balance upon abort).
The final protocol π B m is detailed in the following. The protocol ID is sid. The function to be computed is f (x 1 , . . . , x n ). The protocol participants are P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }. We assume that all parties have registered with the clock functionality in advance and are therefore synchronized once the following steps start.
Setup Generation
The parties invoke the sampling functionality, i.e., every party P i ∈ P starts off by sending the sampling functionality a message (request); the sampling functionality returns (R priv i , R pub ) to P i where R priv i is P i 's private component (including all random coins he needs to run the protocol, along his signing key sk i ) of the setup and R pub is the public component (the same for every party P j ) which includes the vector of UC commitments (Com 1 , . . . , Com n ), where for j ∈ [n], Com j is a commitment to R priv j , along with a vector of public (verification) keys (vk 1 , . . . , vk n ) corresponding to the signing keys (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) and a common reference string CRS. Every party outputs its own public key, as its wallet address for the protocol, i.e., address i = vk i .
Check Availability of Funds
Every party P i ∈ P does the following: P i reads the current state from the ledger. Every party P i receives its input x i (x i = 0 if no input is received in the first activation of P i for time Round2Time(1) − T) and submits to the ledger the following "commitment" transactions: 19
1. For each P j ∈ P : B c,address i ,address j ,Σ i,j,1 ,aux i,j,1 ,σ,τ , where aux i,j,1 = R pub and Σ i,j,1 = (arg 1 i,j,1 , arg 2 i,j,1 , arg 3 i,j,1 ) with
arg 3 i,j,1 = R i,j,1 defined as follows: Let P = P ∪ {P n+1 }, where P n+1 denotes the judge, be the player set implicit in R pub , 20 and let P i ⊆ P denote the set of parties (wallets), such that in the first block posted after time Round2Time(1) − T all parties P k ∈ P i had exactly one transaction for every P j ∈ P with arg 1 k,j,1 = (Round2Time(1), Round2Time(1) + 1), arg 2 k,j,1 = (sid, k, j, 1), and aux 1 k,j,1 = R pub . Furthermore, let P i = P i ∪ {P n+1 }, and let π m | P i be the protocol with public identifiability for computing F +1 | P i , described above and denote by R pub | P i the restriction of the public setup to the parties in P i . Then R i,j,1 (state, buffer, tx) = 1 if and only if the protocol of the judge with public setup R pub | P i accepts the auxiliary string aux tx in tx as P i 's next message in π m | P i (and does not abort).
2. For each round ρ = 2, . . . , ρ m and each P j ∈ P : B c,address i ,address j ,Σ i,j,ρ ,aux 1 i,j,ρ ,σ,τ , where aux 1 i,j,ρ = R pub and Σ i,j,ρ = (arg 1 , arg 2 , arg 3 ) with arg 1 = (Round2Time(ρ), Round2Time(ρ + 1) + 1) arg 2 = (sid, i, j, ρ). arg 3 = R i,j,ρ defined as follows: Let P i , P i , π m | P i be defined as above (and denote P i = {P i 1 , . . . , P im }. Then R i,j,ρ (state, buffer, tx) = 1 if and only if, for each r = 1, . . . , ρ − 1 and each party P i k ∈ P i , the state state includes transactions in which the auxiliary input is aux i k ,r such that the protocol of the judge with public setup R pub | P i , and transcript (aux i 1 ,1 , . . . , aux im,1 ), . . . , (aux i 1 ,ρ−1 , . . . , aux im,ρ−1 ), accepts the auxiliary string aux tx in tx as P i 's next (ρ-round) message in π m | P i (and does not abort).
Claiming Committed Transactions/Executing the Protocol
Time τ ≥ Round2Time(1):
For each ρ = 1, . . . , ρ m + 1, every P i does the following at time Round2Time(ρ),:
1. If τ = Round2Time(ρ m + 1) then go to Step 4; otherwise do the following:
2. Read the ledger's state, and compute P i , P i , π m | P i as above.
3. If the state state is not aborting, i.e, it includes for each r = 1, . . . , ρ − 1 and each party P i k ∈ P i in which the auxiliary input is aux i k ,r such that P i executing π m | P i with public setup R pub | P i , private setup R priv i , and transcript (aux i 1 ,1 , . . . , aux im,1 ), . . . , (aux i 1 ,ρ−1 , . . . , aux im,ρ−1 ) for the first r − 1 rounds does not abort, then compute P i 's message for round ρ, denoted as m ρ , and submit to the ledger for each P k ∈ P i a transaction B c,address k ,address i ,Σ k,i,ρ ,aux ρ k,i,ρ ,σ,τ , where aux ρ k,i,1 = m ρ and Σ k,i,ρ = (arg 1 , arg 2 , arg 3 ) with
4. Otherwise, i.e., if the state state is aborting, then submit to the ledger for each round r = 1, . . . , ρ − 1, and each P k ∈ P a transaction by which the committed trans-20 Recall that R pub includes commitments to all parties' private randomness (including the judge's P d ) used for running the protocol, which is an implicit representation of the player set. action towards P k corresponding to round r is claimed back to address i , 21 i.e., B c,address k ,address i ,Σ,aux,σ,τ , where aux =⊥ and Σ = (arg 1 , arg 2 , arg 3 ) with
This completes the description of the protocol. The protocol terminates in O(ρ m ) (Bitcoin) rounds; thus by using a constant-round protocol π m [IOZ14] , we obtain a protocol with constantly many Bitcoin rounds. Furthermore, as soon as an honest party posts a protocol-related transaction, he is guaranteed to either receive his output or have a positive balance (of at least c coins) after O(ρ m ) Bitcoin rounds. The following theorem states the achieved security. Proof (sketch). We first prove that the above protocol is simulatable, by sketching the corresponding simulator S. If the protocol aborts already before the parties make their transactions, then the simulator can trivially simulate such an abort, as he needs to just receive the state of the ledger and see if all wallets corresponding to honest parties have sufficient funds to play the protocol. In the following we show that the rest of the protocol (including the ledger's contents) can be simulated so that if there is an abort, honest parties' wallets have a positive balance as required by Q fairness. First we observe that the simulator S can easily decide the islands in which the parties are split, as he internally simulates the sampling functionality. Any island other than the one of honest parties (all honest parties will be in the same island because they will post transactions including the same public setup-component) is trivially simulatable as it only consists of adversarial parties and no guarantee is given about their wallets by Q-fairness. Therefore, it suffices to provide a simulator for the honest parties' island. To this direction, the simulator uses the simulator S π m which is guaranteed to exist from the security of π m to decide which messages to embed in the transactions of honest parties (the messages corresponding to corrupted parties are provided by the adversary). If S π m would abort, then S interacts the ideal functionality to abort and continues by claiming back all the committed transactions to the honest parties' wallets, as the protocol would. The soundness of the simulation of S π m ensure that the output of the parties and the contents of the ledger in the real and the ideal world are indistinguishable.
To complete the proof, we argue that when the protocol aborts, then honest parties have a positive balance of at least c coins as required by predicate Q. This is argued as follows: The parties that are not in the honest parties' islands cannot claim any transaction that honest parties make towards them as the ledger will see they as not in the island and reject them. Thus by the last round every honest party will have re-claimed all transactions towards parties not in his island. As fas as parties in the honest island are concerned, if no abort occurs then every party will have posted all his transactions, and therefore the balance will be 0. Otherwise, assume that the protocol aborts because some (corrupted) P i broadcasts an inconsistent message in some round ρ. By inspection of the protocol one can verify that honest parties will be able to claim all transaction-commitments done to them up to round ρ (as they honestly execute their protocol) plus all committed transactions that they made for rounds ρ + 1 . . . , ρ m . Additionally, because P i broadcasts an inconsistent message in rounds ρ, he will be unable to claim transactions of honest parties done for round ρ; these bitcoins will be reclaimed by the honest parties, thus giving their wallets a positive balance of at least c.
Using Ethereum contracts
In this section we comment on the feasibility of implementing our construction using Ethereum contracts. Ethereum is a type of virtual machine that operates over a blockchain protocol and enables the execution of complex transactions, [Woo14] . Transactions in Ethereum contain the recipient of the message, a signature identifying the sender, the amount of ether and the data to send, as well as two values called startgas and gasprice. These two values signify that in order for transactions to be processed "gas" needs to be spent that will be collected by the miner running the transaction. Gas can be funded with ether.
Transaction recipients are regular accounts as well as "smart" contracts. A contract is a special account that has its own code that is executed whenever it receives a transaction or a message. Contracts are stateful in the sense that they can maintain data in local (virtual) memory that has 2 256 entries. A contract when executed can change its local state as well as generate new transactions.
The contract is executed by the miner that processes an incoming transaction for the contract. The decision to execute the contract depends also on the investment made by the transaction that is incoming; contract code may be expensive to run and thus a miner may refuse to execute the code of the contract if it is not sufficiently funded.
When a contract is executed by a miner, the code of the contract has access to various contextual information such as the current block timestamp, the current block number and so on. Using the current block timestamp, in particular, the contract is able to make time-sensitive decisions. For instance, in this way, a party may generate a contract that conditionally transfers some funds to someone that provides a specific type of data in a transaction. The funds may be locked in the contract while after a certain time the funds in the contract may be withdrawn back by the entity that initiated the contract.
Unfortunately Ethereum contracts are not able to inspect the blockchain when they are executed. It follows that they cannot directly implement the type of conditional transactions that our protocol requires as single contracts.
Nevertheless, it is feasible to obtain an implementation of our protocol within Ethereum as follows. First recall the type of transactions required by our protocol.
(B v,address i ,address j ,Σ=(τ − ,τ + ),α,R),aux,σ ) Instead of handling those as transactions, the parties initiate a contract for each protocol instance that accepts messages that encode the above transactions. In more detail, in order to implement the above transaction, an Ethereum transaction is generated from the sender directed to the account of the contract that includes v ether and passes as values tx.data[i], i = 0, 1, 2, . . . the transaction elements v, address i , address j , τ − , τ + , α, R, aux, σ.
The contract when executed with such transaction it uses its contract.storage [.] local state to store the data of the transaction. The contract is credited itself the value v that is put on hold by the transaction.
When a transaction is stored, the contract can accept withdrawing transactions as specified in our protocol description. Given any such withdrawing transaction the corresponding transaction via the anchor α will be recovered and it will be marked as spent if all the accompanying information is acceptable. Note that the contract has access to the current time via the block.timestamp and thus can make decisions with respect to the time parameters τ − and τ + .
Note that in order for a smart contract to process a transaction some additional ether is needed to be spent for using the Ethereum virtual machine (such ether is transformed to gas and is spent when the contract is executed by the miners). In our treatment such costs are considered negligible (while the amount of minimum compensation c is not negligible).
• Let σ k denote the following protocol instances:
-an instance of σ; . This completes the first part of the proof.
